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In the meantime: (A historical context for the events described in this section):

2008 November: Barack Obama elected president of the United States. In one of the first moves, the new administration launches a broad review of the nation's space program.

2010 February: The White House the to return astronauts to the Moon by 2020.

2014: Russia annexes Crimea, triggering a bloody conflict in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Moscow.

Related pages:

2012

Launchers

Industry

Sunkar

Light

Soyuz-5

Yenisei-5

Sodruzhestvo

GLA

MAKS-2013

sep

TGK

 

Russian space program outlook:

 

 

 

Russian space program in the 2010s: decadal review

Status and direction of the Russian space program during a period from 2010 to 2019.

Timeline

Above: A timeline unveiled by the Russian space agency in 2013 outlining general direction of the Russian space program.

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Overall economic outlook

Russia entered the second decade of the 21st century in the midst of the world-wide economic crisis. In , the Russian economy shrank by 8.5 percent, amid declining oil revenues and the flight of foreign capital from the country. As a result, the nation's space budget, heavily dependent on government subsidies, experienced a shortfall in the runup to 2010, pushing a number of projects behind schedule. Still, in a larger economy there were some positive developments on the horizon -- one being a reported long-awaited reversal of the 15-year-long population decline. As a key ingredient of a healthy nation, the population increase promised to reduce Russia's lag behind the economic growth of China, Brazil and India -- nations with emerging economies and, not coincidently, with growing space programs. At least one optimistic Western forecast even gave the Russian economy a chance to overtake Germany's in 2029 and Japan's in 2037. ()

Space budget

Thanks to government subsidies, the Russian space industry weathered the 2008-2012 economic crisis relatively unscathed. During 2012-2015, the Russian government promised to invest 650 billion rubles into the . (According to the data released by the Ministry of Economic Development in September 2012, a total of 590 billion rubles was promised for the Russian space program during 2013-2015). By the end of 2012, the Russian government promised to spend 2.1 trillion rubles (including non-federal funds) before 2020. In April , President Putin quoted 1.6 trillion rubles (.8 billion) to be spent on space program until . The revival of the navigation network and the of the new launch site in were often quoted as the biggest space budget items. Despite a steady growth in the first half of the decade, the space spending was under repeated assaults by the Finance Ministry during budgetary planning, prompting several letters from Roskosmos to the Russian president.

On December 15, 2012, the Russian government approved the latest revision of the Federal Space Program, which covered a time period from 2006 to 2015 and was previously updated in March 2011. The program reportedly doubled the budget for and satellites by shifting funds from other programs. This change in priorities would enable Roskosmos to deploy 95 satellites by and a total of 113 spacecraft by , the head of the agency said. According to the Izvestiya daily, launches of 20 spacecraft were pushed beyond the scope of the program ending in 2015, nine missions were canceled altogether, and 10 new projects were initiated.

In parallel, in January 2013, Roskosmos officially presented to the government a draft of the "State Program" entitled the "Space Activities of the Russian Federation in 2013-2020" with a total price tug of 2,120 billion rubles. The document also contained "foundations" of a space strategy extending until 2030. The responsibility for the accomplishing the goals proclaimed in the new strategy was shared between Roskosmos and the Ministry of Defense. 10 other ministries, including atomic agency, Rosatom, also participated. Echoing , the policy declared and a top priority for the agency, placing to the second place in importance and relegating manned missions to the bottom tier. The proclaimed goal of the program called for the increase of the Russian share in the world's space industry from 10.7 percent in 2011 to 14 percent in and 16 percent in .

In case of a formal approval of the January 2013 document by the Kremlin, Roskosmos would find itself with two overlapping strategies to follow (if not two budgets to finance same projects) until at least 2015. Observers explained such a strange situation by an attempt to camouflage the failure to fulfill the goals of the earlier document ending in 2015 with new declarations in the latest strategy with much more remote deadline of 2020. Such tactic was known as "running on the shifting sand."

According to the officially proclaimed policy, Roskosmos was directed to make the latest strategy public, sans parts dealing with sensitive and commercial secrets. Yet, the document posted on the agency's web site on Jan. 12, 2013, was widely decried as making mockery of informing Russian taxpayers. The vaguely phrased 10-page paper contained practically no new information on the program and also revealed factual errors and major omissions.

Slightly more information was contained in the . Since rockets always form the foundation of any independent space program, the agency's commitment or lack of thereof to the development of new launchers illustrated the pace and scope of the Russian space program. As before, upcoming goals were grouped into time periods before 2015, before 2020, before 2030 and after 2030.

Federal Space Program for 2016-2025 (FKP-2025)

In 2014, Roskosmos drafted the new 10-year Federal Space Program, FKP-2025, which was to cover a period from 2016 to 2025. According to the document, the agency requested 2,315.3 billion rubles of federal funds including:

  • 1,493.0 billion for research and development;
  • 463.3 billion for other expenses;
  • 110.0 billion for capital expenses.

According to Roskosmos, it would buy the agency 180 new spacecraft by 2025. () The picture worsened during the rest of 2014, when falling oil prices coincided with the Russian annexation of Crimea and resulting economic sanctions from Europe and the crash of the ruble. By the end of the year, the Russian economy went into the recession, while the Russian space program faced a serious budget crisis, which increased the cost of all projects by 27 percent on average. As a result, in December 2014, the entire space strategy and its key documents were brought under review. ()

In April 2015, as the Russian economy contracted by two percent, the proposed budget for FKP-2025 was slashed by 800 billion rubles from 2,849.4 billion (counting the latest devaluation of the ruble) to 2,004 billion rubles. During the same period, Roskosmos hoped to earn 1.8 trillion rubles, mostly with profits from commercial launches, satellite communications and space tourism. A number of long-term projects in early stages of development was canceled.

During most of 2015, Roskosmos worked to push the 2016-2025 program through around 20 ministries and institutions, including the Russian Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance and various users of the program, before its final approval by November or December of that year. In addition, Roskosmos also worked to approve its annual budget and projected funding for two subsequent years. As of October 2015, the 2016 budget was expected to see an increase in comparison to the funding for 2015, however that increase would not be as high as first projected in the three-year forecast that had been made in 2014. ()

Roskosmos saw new budget cuts in 2017, some boost promised in 2018

Financial problems for the Russian space program continued into . Going into a three-year budget period covering 2017, and , the government cut a total of 58.8 billion rubles (.02 billion) from ' budget. At the same time, the Ministry of Finance also insisted that the resulting budget would remain flat at the 2017 level of 86 billion rubles (.49 billion) per year for the entire three-year period, Roskosmos sources said. An extra six billion (4 million) was added to the 2018 budget only after some negotiations between space officials and the government. These extra moneys allowed Roskosmos to begin the development of the new-generation launch vehicle and to continue a few other previously stalled programs. However, there will still be a gap between the official cost of formally approved projects and the actual budget available to Roskosmos in the next two years, industry sources said.

Ground infrastructure

As of 2016, a separate Federal Program for the development of three Russian spaceports called for a 750-billion-ruble ( billion) budget from 2016 to 2025. Baikonur would cost 50 billion rubles (8 million), Plesetsk would take 180 billion (2 million) and Vostochny would consume more than 500 billion (.68 billion). However the final program to bring launches of cosmonauts to until the completion of the development of a at the end of the 2020s.

Despite improved funding, the reality showed that money couldn't buy everything. Typically for the Russian economy, the nation's space sector continued suffering from the aging work force, brain drain and inefficiency.

()

Drafting long-term space strategy

On April 26, 2012, Roskosmos, published a presentation, providing details about the nation's space strategy, which was officially approved by the agency behind closed doors back on March 6, 2012, and submitted to the Kremlin and other federal institutions. The document was prepared by a working group led by former head of Roskosmos Yuri Koptev, Roskosmos announced. The public outline painted in rather uncertain terms a broad and mixed picture of Russian goals in space all the way to the year . The first phase of the plan extending to 2015 was highlighted by a practically impossible to fulfill promise to build a . By 2020, a new-generation rocket complex would have to be "deployed" at Vostochny -- yet another unreachable goal. (From 2012, it essentially meant building a for the -based rocket in Vostochny under a code-name Amur.) Around the same time, the would have to be developed, the presentation declared, again, contrary to realistic expectations for such a complex undertaking under current conditions. The Russian "participation" in international missions to , and was listed, without specific launch dates.

During the next phase, extending to 2030, a super-heavy rocket, like or , would have to be deployed in Vostochny, supporting manned Moon landings, along with a variety of missions within a "full range" of Earth orbits. In parallel, serviceable spacecraft of unspecified purpose were promised, along with unmanned missions to , , and Saturn. Missions to remove space junk from space and mitigate threat posed by asteroids would also be possible, the document said.

Within a range of priorities quoted by the document, were pragmatically placed at the highest level, with manned transport systems, including reusable rockets, occupying a second tier in importance, while the development of the internationally sponsored manned mission to Mars and a were both left at the third level.

Despite its vague wording and hefty proclamations, the document clearly highlighted the effort by the current leadership at the agency to steer the industry toward more pragmatic goals than prestige-oriented projects inherited from the Soviet period. The latest strategy clearly echoed previously voiced concern of the Roskosmos' leadership about the need to reform the industry, which was heavily skewed toward manned space flight (with 58 percent of overall space funding going to manned sector), at the expense of and missions. At the same time, the agency apparently still had no choice but to confirm its commitment to a costly and mostly politically motivated enterprise to build a new launch site in the Far East. Given low priority of ambitious manned projects and the virtual absence of funding for a heavy-lifting launch vehicle, the yet-to-be-built launch site threatened to turn into another painful and endless sacrifice to the political altar.

In October 2012, Roskosmos started the 628.8-million-ruble (.8 million) Strategiya and the 726-million-ruble ( million) Programma projects, which aimed to develop the federal space strategy until 2030. Both contracts went to a single bidder -- the agency's own TsNIIMash research institute, which led a similar Magistral and Magistral-2 studies during the . The latest work was completed in May 2013 with the approval of the formal doctrine entitled "Policy foundations in the field of space activities for the Russian Federation until 2030 and beyond."

The change of leadership at Roskosmos in 2013 apparently marked yet another zigzag in the agency's strategy. On Dec. 27, 2013, Roskosmos announced two new tenders -- 883-million-ruble Strategiya-2 and 968.8-million-ruble Programma–2 -- with a total price tag of almost 2 billion rubles ( million) for the development of its strategic documents until 2030. The "winning bid" was to be "selected" on Feb. 13, 2014, and, again, the agency's TsNIIMash was expected to be an inevitable receiver of hefty funding extending until Nov. 25, 2015. However this time, the announcement of the "tender" attracted a critical attention of the Russian public and even of the semi-official press. The newly appointed chief of the agency Oleg Ostapenko, the third space boss since 2011, was quickly blamed for wasteful spending. Although some of the arguments made in those articles were somewhat misguided, they did make a rare criticism of the agency's inefficiency, despite all the money thrown at it in the past decade.

By 2013, Roskosmos drafted a very preliminary roadmap toward the development of the heavy and super-heavy launch vehicles. Not surprisingly, it matched closely the strategy that NASA had followed since 2011 within the Space Launch System, SLS, project. Speaking at the meeting on the prospects of the Russian space program chaired by president Vladimir Putin in Blagoveshensk on April 12, the head of Roskosmos Vladimir Popovkin said that the agency had been conducting the study (known as Magistral) into the launch vehicle with a payload of 75-80 tons and whose "open architecture" would enable to upgrade it later to carry up to 120-130 tons into the low Earth orbit. Whether the Russian government would endorse, let alone fund such a plan, remained unclear at the time. Still, TsSKB Progress, RKK Energia and GKNPTs Khrunichev were known working on alternative proposals.

()

Traditionally, manned space flight remained one of the strongest areas of the Russian space program, taking at least 50 percent of the space budget. During its 10-year space budget from 2006 to 2015, Russia reportedly spent 186.6 billion rubles for the ongoing assembly and operation of the , ISS. With improved funding in the second half of 2000s, Russian government started planning new goals for its cosmonauts, largely reflecting US efforts, including lunar expeditions. However, in February 2010, the Obama administration the plan to return to the Moon within the . The move could have major implications for other space-faring powers, first of all Russia and , for years to come. Russian space officials hurried to re-affirm the public that the crisis in the US would have no effect on the the nation's long-term plans. However, an overly ambitious program by Roskosmos to build a , introduce a whole in and a in looked less and less realistic. Critics questioned the wisdom of committing to a decade-long development program, instead of upgrading the existing spacecraft for , which could be accomplished within few years.

Even RKK Energia, the country's main and only manned spacecraft developer, was weary of the agency's grandiose space plans. During 2010 and 2011, the company tried to convince Roskosmos to limit the mass of the next-generation spacecraft to 12 tons, thus enabling its launch on a medium-class vehicle based on the existing and in . The company was also quietly seeking commercial collaboration with an emerging crop of manned spacecraft developers in the US.

In the meantime, the partners involved into the ISS project faced a difficult dilemma: where to go next in space with limited funding available to space agencies on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the ISS was to operate until at least , decisions about the future would have to be made well in advance, particularly, if space agencies wanted to join forces in an effort to expand human space flight beyond the Earth orbit. In the absence of a bold commitment to go to the , or asteroids, space planners in the US and Russia considered sending , which could serve as staging hubs for deep-space exploration, if such projects ever became affordable.

In the meantime, inside Russia, there were first signs that the manned space flight was no longer an untouchable holy cow. In 2011, the newly appointed head of the Russian space agency Vladimir Popovkin first warned that the national space program had overemphasized manned missions. This attitude was echoed by the Kremlin in August 2013, when the Russian Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin told Vesti-24 TV channel that Roskosmos officials had had to learn how to answer question what (manned space flight) was for. "If in the past we were launching cosmonauts to prove the world that they could work in orbit for a very long time, now, we have many other practical applications in unmanned space flight that we ought to pursue," Rogozin said.

()

Russia's most neglected field of space exploration had to essentially make an attempt at rebirth during 2010s. Beginning in 2011, Roskosmos promised to launch long-delayed probes to , and , along with a new-generation of orbital observatories , , and for astronomy and astrophysics research. At the time, a newly appointed head of the Russian space agency, Vladimir Popovkin, said that Russia would return to the old Soviet practice of sending a pair of probes to each destination in the Solar System, thus doubling chances for success of costly deep-space missions. () In the first sign of implementation of this policy, the first Russian mission to explore the Sun from its vicinity under the was promised to be split into two vehicles.

Following the Phobos-Grunt , all planetary exploration and science projects in Russia faced uncertain future. In mid-January 2012, NPO Lavochkin reportedly submitted a new concept of planetary exploration to Roskosmos. As it transpired in the following months, a pair of with launches not expected before 2016-2017, while other deep-space missions were pushed into 2020s. Missions to Mars could now be limited to a possible in 2018 as the earliest and to the Russian participation in the European launches in 2016 and 2018. The latter mission could be merged with the project. An , remained in a definition state, with the launch date around 2020, as the earliest. Missions to and were deferred to the next decade. A very preliminary plan for the exploration of Saturn under the Saturn-TE project was also drafted at the beginning of the decade, but its preliminary development, NIR, was not expected until 2017-2019.

Military and civilian application satellites

A large nomenclature of satellites for watching the Earth and its environment was planned during 2000s, however constant delays and onboard failures pushed most of the hopes to the next decade. Still, a new generation of satellites developed in the post-Soviet period was finally introduced in , with the launches of the and missions. Both projects were based on advanced satellite platforms which did not require pressurization to preserve their components, thus promising longer life in space.

In 2012, the Russian government officials said that 200 civilian and 100 military spacecraft would have to be launched by 2020. At the same time, Russia's main manufacturer of military and civilian satellites ISS Reshetnev reported that nearly 50 spacecraft had been in various stages of development, requiring the construction of a new assembly and testing facility with an area of 45,000 square meters. The contemporary constellation of Russian satellites included 118 operational spacecraft, according to the official numbers in 2012 and "more than 120" were quoted operating in orbit in mid 2015. (The statistics probably counted dual-purpose spacecraft as two vehicles.)

The Russian government put a special emphasis on rebuilding the remote-sensing constellation. With the launch of , , BKA and satellites during 2012, Russia deployed as many as nine Earth-watching cameras in orbit. A total of 26 remote-sensing satellites were promised to fly by 2020. However, the 2012 revision of the Federal Space Program did kill a pair of radar-carrying Arkon-2M satellites, the material-science Vozvrat-MKA capsule, the Koronas-Nuklon sun-watching spacecraft and the ill-fated search-and-rescue signal satellite.

In the field of , the second phase of the Federal space program, covering the period from 2011 to 2015, called for the deployment of 22 satellites, however this goal .

Missile systems

Another major field of responsibilities for Roskosmos extended into strategic missile systems. The agency oversaw key organizations responsible for the production of and , as well as . In February 2011, Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, promised to triple the nation's spending on defense development from 0.5 to 1.5 percent of the GDP, beginning in 2012. In the course of the decade, some 0 billion were to be spent on the procurement of new weapons, including eight nuclear submarines and . Ten divisions of the Russian armed forces would receive S-500 anti-missile systems.

The development of the new liquid-propellant ballistic missile to replace Ukrainian-built s was first announced at the end of 2009, however, apparently, the program was not officially approved until 2011. At the time, a new 100-ton vehicle, was not expected to fly until at least 2022. The development of the project was likely delegated to NPO Mashinostroenia, which previously designed the family of missiles.

In 2009, Russian Ministry of Defense also resumed funding for , however three years later Russia had significantly lagged in the field behind the United States, Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said during his visit to Raduga enterprise specialized in missile systems. He called for boosting the status of hypersonic research projects to the highest priority level.

 

An overview of Russia's major research and development projects in rocketry and spacecraft during 2010s:

Manned spaceflight

2021

-

2024

-

Included in FKP-2025

1993

1997

1998

-

Included in FKP-2025

2021

2025

2035

billion ()

Concept evaluation (); Included in FKP-2025

2016

-

-

-

Concept evaluation; Included in FKP-2025 Mars (expedition)

2013

2021

-

-

Concept evaluation ()

-

2010

2010

-

Launched, operational

1999

2007

2017

-

In development; () Included in FKP-2025

2009

2014

2019

-

Full-scale development started in 2012 (); Included in FKP-2025 NEM-2

2010

2015

-

-

Concept evaluation () NEM-1 heavy

2024

2029

-

-

Concept evaluation () NEM-2 heavy

2025

2030

-

-

Concept evaluation ()

2009

2013

2018

-

In development; Included in FKP-2025

2019

2022

2022

-

In 2014, proposed for FKP-2025

2006

2012-2015 ()

R2.82 billion

Cost for 2006-2014; Included in FKP-2025; OKA-T-2

2019

2024

2024

R14,443 million

Included in FKP-2025. In April 2015, deferred beyond FKP-2025 /

2018 (?)

2020

-

-

Concept evaluation () OPSEK core module

2015

2020

-

-

Concept evaluation () Power module (EM)

2021

2025

2025

R13.7 billion

Proposed for FKP-2025 but not included.

-

-

-

-

-

2009

2015

2021

R60.77 billion

In development during FKP-2015, -2025

2010

2012

-

In flight testing TGKS ()

?

2009

2015

-

Preliminary development ()

2016

2021

2021

R12.3 billion

Proposed for FKP-2025.

2016

2020

-

-

Preliminary design completed in 2016

-

-

-

-

Preliminary studies

Planetary spacecraft

-

-

-

-

A circa 2013 proposal

2019

2025

after 2020

-

Definition stage

2009

2011

2014 (, ) -2018, 2019; 2022

R4.2 billion

In development; Included in FKP-2025. Postponed to 2025

2012

2016

2016 or 2018

R5.6 billion

In development; Included in FKP-2025

2012

2018

2018 or 2020

In development; Included in FKP-2025

-

2020

2022

-

Preliminary development, NIR;

-

2012

2019

-

Full-scale development; Included in FKP-2025

-

2012

2021

-

Full-scale development; Included in FKP-2025

2016 (?)

2019

2025

R11 billion ()

Definition stage; Included in FKP-2025

2009

2018

2023

-

Preliminary development, NIR; Included in FKP-2025

-

after 2020

2022

-

Definition stage

-

2016 ()

?

-

Deferred;

-

2024

2030?

-

In definition stage

2016?

2016

after 2020

-

In definition stage

1992

1998

-

-

2016

2025

R5.1 billion

A 2011-2012 proposal Saturn system mission (Saturn-TE)

2019

2026

-

-

In definition stage, a possible Russian orbiter and a balloon contributed to a European program

2014

-

-

-

In definition stage

2010

2016

2026

Preliminary development until 2009, deferred Venera-Glob

2016?

2021

-

-

A possible Russian lander contributed to a European EVE project or an independent project

Science spacecraft

1-M class planetary observatory

2020

2028

-

-

A proposal Astrogon

-

-

-

-

A proposal (-based)

-

-

2018 ()

-

In definition phase Astron-2

-

-

-

-

In definition phase (No. 1)

-

2010 ()

2013 April 19

-

First launched, three in development; Included in FKP-2025 (No. 2, 3)

-

2013

2019/2021

5.9 billion ()

In development

-

2010

2014 April

-

Launched Gamma-400 -

2013

2018-2019

-

In definition phase. In April 2015, deferred beyond FKP-2025 GEOMAG

-

-

-

-

A proposal (-based) Ionosfera (Zond)

-

-

-

-

A proposal (-based) Ionozond

-

-

-

-

A proposal (-based) Koronas-Nuklon

-

-

-

R753.5 million

A 750-kilogram spacecraft canceled in 2012. LIDA

-

-

-

-

A proposal (-based) (Mikhailo Lomonosov)

2006

2010

2016 April 28

-

A proposal (-based) LORD

-

-

-

-

A proposal (-based) Lunnaya Doroga

-

-

-

-

A proposal (-based) MKA-AVKP

-

-

-

-

A proposal (-based)

-

2008

2012

-

Launched successfully; failed in 2013

-

2010

-

Launched successfully; failed prematurely

-

2013

-

-

Canceled in March 2014

-

2014

-

-

Canceled in March 2014

-

-

2007- ()

-

Canceled in March 2014 Orbital Observatory for High Energy, OLVI

2024

-

-

-

A proposal circa 2014 for a 12-ton satellite Rentgenovsky Mikrofon

-

-

-

-

A proposal for an X-ray astrophysics satellite circa 2012 Rezonans (MKA FKI)

-

2012 (), 2014 ()
2017-2018

2019

-

OKR (in development); approved Roy

-

-

-

Preliminary studies (NIR) of plasma-research project

1982

1997

2011

-

; delayed from 2000

-

-

2021

€100 million ()

In development; delayed from 2000

-

2000

2017

R5 billion

In development; delayed from 2000

-

2018 ()

2020-2022

est. million

Preliminary design. In April 2015, deferred beyond FKP-2025 SVCh-RK

-

-

-

-

A proposal (-based) Terion F2  

-

2018 ()

In definition phase Tsvetok

-

-

-

-

A proposal (-based)

2009

2016

2021-2025

R860 million

A proposed life-science spacecraft; Included in FKP-2025. In April 2015, deferred beyond FKP-2025

Known military spacecraft

-

-

-

R672.8 million

In development since 2012

2007

2012

2015 Feb. 27

-

Two satellites launched Blagovest

?

?

2016

-

-

2016 (?)

-

-

-

- ESSS-3

-

-

-

-

Communications network

-

2009?

-

No. 11L, 12L launched

-

-

-

Failed to reach correct orbit Gerakl-KV

-

-

-

-

Designed to replace Garpun data relay satellite Klyuch

-

-

-

-

Designed to replace Rodnik communications satellites

-

-

-

-

Operational, might be close to retirement

1993

1997?

-

Launched Labirint-V

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Operational

-

-

-

-

Operational Napryazhenie/Nevilir

-

after 2015

-

-

In development

-

-

R5 billion ()

No. 1 failed soon after reaching orbit; No. 2 launched in 2013; No. 3 in 2015

-

-

-

Operational Razdan (14F156)

-

2019, 2022, 2024

-

-

Disclosed in 2016

-

-

-

-

Operational Sfera-S

-

-

2021

-

Developed to replace in the ESSS-3 network Sfera-V

-

-

-

-

Developed to replace in the ESSS-3 network

1999

2005

2015 Nov. 17

-

Early warning spacecraft for the EKS network

Civilian application and dual-purpose spacecraft

Aist

-

-

2013

-

-

-

-

2016 April 28

-

- Arkon-2

-

-

-

-

Three-band radar satellite; canceled Arkon-2M

-

2009

2015

-

X-band radar satellite; canceled in 2012

-

2013

2017

R5.4 billion

-

-

2022

-

-

In 2015, postponed beyond 2025

-

-

2017/2020

R5.4 billion

- Asteroid protection spacecraft

2016?

-

-

R23 billion ()

In definition stage as of 2014 BLITS-2

2013

?

?

?

Calibration satellite Braslet

2013

?

?

?

Communications satellite Dopler

-

-

-

-

Data relay; Included in FKP-2025

-

-

2014 March 16

-

-

-

-

2014 March 16

-

-

-

-

2011 Aug. 18

-

-

-

2014 May 16

-

-

-

2013 Dec. 26

-

-

-

-

2014 Oct. 21

-

-

-

-

2015 March 19

-

-

-

-

2015 Sept. 14

-

-

2012

2015

2015 Dec. 25

Euro 300 million

- Ekspress-AMU3

-

-

-

-

Included in FKP-2025 Ekspress-AMU7

-

-

-

-

Included in FKP-2025 -1/2

-

-

2012 August 6

-

Launched Ekspress-RV

-

-

-

-

Included in FKP-2025 Ekspress-80

-

-

-

-

Included in FKP-2025 Ekspress-103

-

-

-

-

Included in FKP-2025 (No. , , )

-

-

2011 Jan. 20

-

, launched Elektro-M

-

2018

2021

-

- Enisei-A1/A2 (Luch-4)

-

-

-

-

Experimental comsat; Included in FKP-2025 Ellips

-

-

-

-

Included in FKP-2025

-

-

2011 Feb. 26

-

Launched

-

2013

2016?

-

Preliminary design in 2012-2013

-

-

-

-

Included in FKP-2025

-

-

2017

-

Included in FKP-2025

2000

2006

2015 (failure)

-

Ocean remote-sensing satellite -V No. 1

-

-

2012 July 22

-

Up to six satellites planned by 2020

-

2013

2017

-

Infrared payload for wild fire detection Kanopus-VM

-

-

2021/2022/2023

-

- Kartograf

-

2014

2017

-

- Kondor-FKA (E)

2016

2018

2018

million

Included in FKP-2025 Kosmos-SKh

-

-

-

-

Canceled? Lider

-

2025

-

-

Included in FKP-2025 Luch-M (/5B)

2002 June 21

2008

-

Launched Luch-5M

-

-

-

-

Included in FKP-2025 Maksat-R

-

-

?

Radar satellite -M//M2-1, M2-2

-

-

-

M2 launched in 2014 Meteor-MP

-

2021

2023

-

An addition to preliminary design 2011-2012 MKA-N

2012

2015

-

R315 million

An imaging nano-satellite

2012

2015

2018

-

In development; Included in FKP-2025

2013

-

2018

-

In development; to replace Arkon-2M; Included in FKP-2025 Obzor-LP

-

2022/2024/2025

-

-

Included in FKP-2025 Okean

-

2019

-

-

-

-

2010

2013

R2.64 billion

Launched, operational

-

2010

R2.64 billion

Launched, operational

-

?

2016

R2.64 billion

In development Resurs-PM (P No. 4, 5)

-

2015/2016 ()

2017- 2018

-

In development

-

-

-

-

Canceled in 2012 after two failed launches (MiR)

-

2008?

2012 July 28

R30-40 million

Launched Yamal-GK (1, 2, 3)

2016

2018

-

R47,809 million

Included in FKP-2025 Yamal-GK VEO (1, 2, 3)

2018

2021

-

R35,700 million

Included in FKP-2025

Launch vehicles, upper stages and space propulsion

1994

2005

2017

-

In flight testing

1994

2005

-

In flight testing

2012

2018

2021

5.6 million

In preliminary development (?)

2015

2023

-

-

In preliminary development (?)

-

-

-

-

- Dvina-DM

-

-

-

-

Upper stage in development

2004

-

-

-

Launched MRKS

2005

2016

after 2030

-

In definition stage Nuclear-electric tug, MMB

2012

2018

-

0 million

-

-

-

-

-

Upper stage project for Angara-5

-

2015

-

-

Canceled in 2011

2004

2011

-

Undergoing flight testing

-

-

-

-

Preliminary design completed Soyuz-2-3v

-

-

-

-

A 2011 proposal from TsSKB Progress Soyuz-2-1d

-

-

-

-

A 2012 proposal from TsSKB Progress

2013

2020-2025

2019

-

A 2013 proposal from TsSKB Progress Turkestan

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

A 2012 RKK Energia proposal

-

-

-

-

A 2016 industry proposal

-

2028

-

-

A concept (Feniks)

-

-

-

-

In development Elementy STK ()

2016

2028

-

-

Initial studies

Launch and support infrastructure

in

-

-

-

Operational

2004

-

-

Not developed

2003

2007

-

Operational

2007

2015

2016

-

Partly operational and in development Vostochny ()

2011

84 billion rubles

Operational Vostochny ()

2012

2018

2021

-

In development

-

-

2015

-

In development

Military missiles

S-500

-

-

-

-

New-generation anti-missile system Avangard-R

-

-

2022

-

Proposed railway-based ICBM (?); new liquid-propellant ICBM (?); ()

-

-

-

-

Flight testing

-

-

-

-

Operational deployment

2009

-

-

-

R&D program Lainer

-

-

-

-

Rubezh

-

-

-

-

Modified Topol-M ICBM (?)

2009-2011 (?)

2016 (?)

2019-2021 (?)

-

Multi-warhead liquid-propellant ICBM ICBM

-

-

1994

-

Operational deployment Yars

-

-

-

-

Mobile and silo-based Topol-M with MIRV warhead (?) Kinzhal

-

-

2018

-

-

 

Key government and Roskosmos decisions related to Russian space activities during the 2010s:

Date Issuing body, document title/subject Document No. 2010 Nov. 11 An order of the government of the Russian Federation on the development of the strategy "Space Activities of Russia during 2013-2020." No. 1950-r 2011 Feb. 19 An order of the Russian President No. PR-412 2011 Feb. 22 A directive of the Roskosmos head - 2011 March 10 A directive of the Chairman of the Russian government No. VP-P7-1347 2011 March 31 A government decree on amendments to the Russian Federal Space Program from 2006 to 2015 No. 235 2011 Aug. 18 An order of the Roskosmos head No. VP-195 2011 Dec. 22 An order of the Roskosmos head to implement the regulation on production and use of rocket and space technology RK-11-KT. No. 232 2012 March 3 Decree of the government of the Russian Federation on the creation of the support infrastructure of the as a part of the federal program "The Development of the Russian Cosmodromes in 2006-2015" No. 188 2012 May 7 A Decree of the Russian President "On the long-term economic policy of Russia" No. 596-606 2012 Aug. 28 A Russian government order on formation of the directorate No. 1546-r 2012 Dec. 15 A government decree on amendments to the Russian Federal Space Program during 2006-2015 No. 1306 2012 Dec. 28 Russian government order: On the state program of the Russian Federation "Space activities of Russia during 2013-2020" No. 2594-r 2013 April 19 Decree of the Russian President: Foundations of the state policy in space activities until 2030 and beyond No. Pr-906 2013 May 29 A directive of the Government of the Russian Federation to prepare the Federal Space Program for the period from 2016 to 2025, FKP-2025. No. RD-P7-3584 2013 June 26 A presidential order "On the commission for the structuring of the control system for the rocket and space industry." No. 250-rp 2013 Dec. 2 A presidential decree on the formation of the Unified Rocket and Space Corporation, ORKK No. 874 2014 Jan. 27 An order of the Federal Space Agency on the Organizing for the Preparation of the Draft of the Federal Space Program from 2016 to 2025 No. ON-24-rsp 2014 Feb. 3 An order of the Russian government on the formation of the , ORKK No. 114-r 2014 Sept. 10 An order of the President of the Russian Federation No. Pr-2165 2014 Sept. 10 An order of the President of the Russian Federation to re-subordinate the Military Industrial Commission from the Russian government to the Russian President No. 627 2014 Nov. 19 A Russian government order "On some issues around the activities of federal organization "Vostochny spaceport directorate" No. 1217 2015 Dec. 25 A Russian government decree "On state defense procurement for 2015 and 2016-2017." No. 1480-54 2015 July 13 A Federal Law on Roskosmos State Corporation No. 215-FZ 2015 July 25 A joint decision of Ministry of Defense and "On the Order of Implementation of the Development Project, OKR, and OKR Dvina-DM" No. IK-287-r 2015 Dec. 28 A Russian President decree "On dissolution of the Russian Space Agency" No. 666 2016 March 23 Decision of the Russian government on the Federal Space Program from 2016 to 2025. No. 230 2016 May 12 A Russian President decree "On measures for the creation of State corporation for space activities " No. 221 2016 June 2 A Russian Prime Minister order on the list of members of the State Commission for the testing of manned systems chaired by Aleksandr Ivanov of GK Roskosmos No. 1117-r 2016 Aug. 19 A Russian government decree "On measures for implementation of the Presidential Decree No. 221 from May 12, 2016, for the formation of corporation" No. 824 2017 March 30 Roskosmos decision on the Elementy STK No. KI-153-r 2017 Sept. 19 A decree of the government of the Russian Federation approving the Federal Program "Development of Russian Cosmodromes during 2017 - 2025 in support of the Russian space activities." No. 1124 2018 Jan. 29 A decree of the Russian president "On the creation of the ." No. 32 2018 May 18 A decree of the Russian president "On providing social payments to some categories of Russian citizens subject to resettlement from Baikonur for purchasing residential properties in the Russian Federation." No. 219

 

Book

of the orbiting assembly shop to replace the after 2020 could serve as the foundation for an international program of deep space exploration.